In the second and final installment of The Irrawaddy’s interview
with Professor Larry Diamond, the Stanford University democracy scholar
discusses complaints about the leadership style of Aung San Suu Kyi, the
rise of Ma Ba Tha and the efforts to negotiate a nationwide ceasefire
agreement with Irrawaddy founding editor Aung Zaw.
We’ve seen examples of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership and its
shortcomings, particularly in the recent case of the candidate list.
I know many democrats in Burma, both in her party and in civil
society, who are worried that her leadership style is not sufficiently
consultative, open, transparent and self-confident. That there’s too
closed a leadership style and not a sufficiently inclusive approach to
the management of the party and the crafting of a broad opposition
coalition. I know that many people are worried about this. I think these
concerns actually surfaced not that long after she was released from
house arrest and began to mobilize and rebuild the party. One hoped that
this would pass and a different leadership style would develop, but I
certainly continue to hear these concerns.
It’s not for me to judge, I just take note of the fact that many
people I respect in Burma—not only in civil society, not only in say,
the ’88 Generation, but within the NLD, including people who have
received nominations to run on her party ticket—are concerned that this
is, first of all, not entirely democratic, second of all, that it’s
weakening the NLD as a party, keeping it from developing the modern
party machinery that it needs to be competitive in the election and to
govern well if it should become the leading party in parliament. So
we’ll see what happens. I know that it’s a long journey and maybe a
different style will appear during the election campaign or after the
election, but it’s a concern that I’ve heard from a number of people.
People are very worried what the NLD will be if she’s not there.
In the nearly five years that she has been free from the horrible
experience of house arrest, she has grown in her involvement in
political life by first returning to politics, then being elected to
parliament, then being a very significant figure in parliament. She has
not had to govern the country. She’s been a significant player, but
she’s not had to govern the country. If the NLD wins a large plurality
of the seats in parliament and then basically forms a governing
coalition, which I think is a very good possibility if the election is
free and fair, then she as the leader of the NLD will in essence have to
govern. Even if she’s not president, she’ll likely be speaker of the
Lower House, or in some major role where she will have a very
significant responsibility for governing. At that point, things will
have to change, or I think the NLD will probably suffer a lot of
hemorrhaging of public support.
What are the hopes of the younger, future political leaders of this country, and how do you see them shaping the future?
I think they’ll play multiple roles. Some of these people will
probably enter parliament, some are already on the NLD list of
candidates, like Zin Mar Aung. I think she probably has a good chance of
winning her constituency. Some of them probably wanted to be candidates
for the NLD and were not given the opportunity to do so. There will be
by-elections at some point, there will still be opportunities for them
to be brought in. That’s one possibility. Another possibility is,
there’s an absolutely huge role for democratic leaders, former student
leaders and other activists to build the democracy that people want to
see emerge here in Burma.
There’s going to need to be a massive effort in civic education, in
parliamentary and government monitoring, the construction of some kind
of policy think tank for the democratic opposition that can advise and
support their members of parliament and maybe push the government toward
a competent, well thought out and socially just agenda. I think there
will be people from within the broad opposition element, in the ’88
Generation and all of the other protests elements, and everybody who
struggled and lobbied for democracy, who will be brought in to the
parliament and who will be brought into the government. My sense is, Min
Ko Naing is one of them, who don’t see themselves in the near future
being in government, who imagine themselves as having a different
role—that of moral leaders, thought leaders, creative leaders in the
society.
There are other people who will be in civil society and may
eventually enter parliament and government in a different way. One
scenario is that more and more people will be gradually brought into the
NLD as the system evolves. Another scenario is that if the NLD doesn’t
perform, modernize and become more inclusive—which I think it will—but
if it doesn’t, they may decide to form another opposition party and take
their chances at some point in the future.
Inevitably there will be political evolution, we just don’t know what
it’s going to look like. I hope the electoral system will change. I
don’t think first-past-the-post or single member district pluralities
are very good systems for Burma. It creates too many rigidities, and too
many concerns about splitting the vote. You don’t want a situation,
like in 1990, where the governing party wins 20 percent of the vote and 3
percent of the seats. That’s actually not a good situation for
democracy. It doesn’t give them an incentive to play the democratic
game.
If the elections are reasonably honest, if the democratic forces do
well, but the military still has a strong veto power, I can actually see
a deal being cut in the next parliament, whereby the NLD agrees to
change the electoral system with a significant proportional element, and
in return the military gradually agrees to reduce and eliminate its 25
percent of the seats. That wouldn’t be a bad bargain.
If Aung San Suu Kyi and the military are the ones with power
in 2016 and Shwe Mann is no longer there, they will have to negotiate.
Of course, it’s absolutely essential. But I can only tell you, this
is a long game. Something very dramatic and deeply disturbing has
happened [with the sidelining of Shwe Mann]. But it’s one development in
a very long game. The situation after the November elections may look
very different than it does now. It may look better, it may look worse.
The situation a year from now, after the elected government has taken
office and begun to govern, may look different again. Alignments change,
people learn to deal with one another, so one needs to imagine how this
will unfold over an extended period of time. It’s very clear that
democracy is not going to be achieved fully in the November elections.
There are many obstacles that are going to remain over a long period of
time, and it’s going to need a very good strategy, a lot of persistence,
a lot of subtlety, a certain amount of courage and willingness to
mobilize, to push democratic reform in the face of a very complicated
set of obstacles.
Let’s talk about the rise of Ma Ba Tha and the rise of the
969 movement, which occurred shortly after the by-election in which Aung
San Suu Kyi’s party won the majority of votes. A lot of people are
saying that we should be wary of Ma Ba Tha, and wondering whether the
group will have an effect on the election.
In the heat of an election campaign, it’s going to be hard to get
Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic politicians to go as far as one
would like in the direction of reigning in this xenophobia and
intolerance. People become a little risk-averse during an election
campaign and want to consolidate their support. Once the election is
over and the new parliament starts taking shape, it’s going to be really
important for the new elected officials coming from the democratic camp
to confront this more forthrightly and to say that this is not
Buddhism. This is not loving kindness, this is not compassion. This is
bigotry and hatred, and it has no place in the framework in any of the
world’s religions.
It’s antithetical to the basic principles of Christianity, Judaism,
Islam and so on. In what little I know of Buddhism, it seems
particularly antithetical to Buddhist principles! There needs to be an
affirmation from across the board in society—religious, secular,
political leaders—that everybody has equal worth and dignity as human
beings, everybody has certain rights under international law and under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that people’s religion should
not disqualify them from politics or from a place in the political
system or from exercising their rights of citizenship and that bigotry
should not be tolerated.
It’s shocking to see the government fail to take concrete action.
I think there will be a new opportunity when the transition finally
takes a new phase, when the government forms under the Constitution
after the results of the election. I think there will be a new
opportunity to take a forthright approach and I hope the newly elected
officials in the parliament and government will do that.
This country has dozens of ethnic armed groups and the
government has been trying to reach out to them for the first time in
history. There is a hope that there will be a nationwide ceasefire
agreement with quite a number of ethnic forces. A lot of donor countries
and Western governments are involved in this process. How do you think
this process will play out?
This country has suffered so badly from the longest running series of
civil wars in the history of the world. Anyone who values human rights,
peace, social justice and so on should hope that the country can
negotiate a just an durable ceasefire and permanent peace. If President
Thein Sein can do that, I wish him well and I hope he succeeds. I may
not like some of the other things that the government has done and is
doing, but if they do that I think it will be a great achievement. If
he’s doing that because he thinks it will bring stability to the
country, I think he’s right. If he’s doing it because he thinks it will
help the USDP at the polls, maybe it will and maybe it won’t.
But whatever his motives are, I hope he succeeds. If it can only be
done right now with 14 of the 16 groups that are potentially part of the
dialogue, then better 14 than none. From what I hear, the dialogue has
gone far, it’s very nearly ready to be signed, and I think it would be
very significant progress for Burma. This country’s had enough fighting,
enough violence, and enough war. Anything that can be done to settle
these conflicts and produce peace under a federal system, which I think
is a very important principle, is going to be progress.
Do you think that the military will accommodate a genuine federal union in this country?
Look, the military has a history of favoring centralized rule. So I’m
sure there will be differences of opinion about what constitutes
federalism, of how federal the current system is, I understand that, but
the point is, it’s better to move this dispute to the parliament and
the political bargaining table than to have it continue to play out or
be at constant risk of flaring up on the military battlefield. So I wish
Thein Sein well in this regard, I wish the armed insurgent groups in
the pursuit of peace. I hope they succeed.
Do you think with the serious political backsliding in this
country, the US has moved too far to provide legitimacy to the Burmese
government?
Probably a little too far. I was in favor of the opening and the
lifting of some sanctions. I did warn at the time that we should
probably be a little deliberate about it. But there was a train that was
leaving the station, in terms of international enthusiasm, to
incorporate Burma into Asean, to formalize investment relations. There’s
a connectivity revolution happening in Burma now. Everybody’s getting
cell phones, the internet is spreading, this can only be a good thing
for freedom and democracy. This wouldn’t be happening without the pace
of foreign investment coming in. So I think what’s necessary now is not
so much to revisit the past and argue about whether we moved too fast to
lift sanctions, it’s to think about next steps.
I can tell you this: Burma occupies a special place in the hearts and
minds of many members of US Congress and significant parts of American
society. There’s just a special relationship. It’s like South Africa in
the 1980s and ‘90s. People care about it a great deal and feel a kind of
moral, emotional and symbolic investment in this transition. If this
transition turns out to be a fraud, and there is a massive distortion of
the vote and grave electoral miscarriage, I think it will have very
serious consequences for our bilateral relationships, and for investor
judgments about stability in Burma. People are not simply going to take
this happily and say, ‘Okay, you rigged your way back into power and
we’re just going to go about our daily business.’ People are going to be
angry and upset, inside Burma and outside Burma.
I think that there will probably be some awareness of this, among
some actors who might be tempted to behave in less democratic ways, and
hopefully that will help to inspire their better angels to respect the
democratic process. But if there is an enormous institutional setback to
democracy in Burma, this will have very serious consequences for the
bilateral relationship. I am pretty confident that if it doesn’t happen
while Barack Obama is president, there will probably be a very serious
reaction when a new president takes power.
Irrawaddy

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